


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
SPECIAL REPORT

TURBULENCE AMONG FRANCE'S AFRICAN PROTEGES

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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
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13 December 1963

TURBULENCE AMONG FRANCE'S AFRICAN PROTEGES

During the past year instability has spread dramatically through the grouping of 13 politically moderate, French-speaking African states which have stayed closely tied to France since they became independent in 1960. In three of these states, ruling "old elite" regimes have been overthrown and new elements have entered the power structure. In three others, established leaders have been shaken by unprecedented challenges to their authority. So far the disturbances have been essentially internal, and have had little effect on the Paris-oriented foreign policies of these countries. All are still members of the Afro-Malagasy Union (UAM)--along with the former Belgian trust territory of Rwanda. However, continuing instability in the states which have experienced major crises and danger signs in others suggest that the Communist countries may soon find new opportunities for expanding their presence and influence in this area.

A Year of Crises


The first major postindependence crisis in the UAM states arose in Senegal in December 1962, when reformist Prime Minister Mamadou Dia attempted to use military force to overawe a hostile, conservative-minded parliament. President Leopold Senghor, however, quickly took control of the military and arrested Dia, thereby ending a two-year experiment in shared executive power.

A month later Togo's national hero, President Sylvanus Olympio, was assassinated by a group of vengeful military malcontents, who set up a heterogeneous new regime composed of Olympio's political foes. Their action threatened to touch off a general West African donnybrook, but uncontested elections in May

in effect legitimized the new regime.

Ivory Coast has been in turmoil virtually all year. In January, President Felix Houphouet-Boigny uncovered an apparently well-advanced scheme to assassinate him, and he proceeded to arrest some 150 people, the majority of whom probably had nothing to do with the plot. The ensuing political trial resulted in 13 death sentences--not yet carried out--and prison terms for 51 others. Late in August the country was again filled with rumors of plots, general strikes, and antigovernment demonstrations. After Houphouet's return from four months of foreign travel, discovery of a new "plot" was announced. The second wave of political arrests and deportations is still going on. This

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AFRICA

Afro-Malagasy Union (UAM)

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	POPULATION Projected to September 1963	ESTIMATED GNP Per Capita
Cameroon	4,300,000	\$ 86
Central African Republic	1,300,000	60
<u>Chad</u>	3,000,000	54
<u>Congo (Brazzaville)</u>	800,000 (1962)	40
<u>Dahomey</u>	2,100,000 (1962)	40
Gabon	450,000	200
<u>Ivory Coast</u>	3,500,000	174
Malagasy Republic	5,900,000	85
Mauritania	800,000	under 50
Niger	3,300,000	65
Rwanda*	2,950,000	40
<u>Senegal</u>	3,200,000	192
<u>Togo</u>	1,500,000	71
Upper Volta	4,500,000	40
TOTAL:	37,600,000	\$ 73

TOTAL for ALL OF AFRICA: 266,100,000

AVERAGE for
ALL OF AFRICA: \$ 122

Countries underlined have been scenes of major unrest. The governments of Togo, Congo (Brazzaville), and Dahomey were overthrown in 1963.

*Rwanda, a former Belgian trust territory which joined the UAM in 1963, is not closely allied to France.

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time those detained have included not only top-level politicians but almost anyone of any prominence who has at any time opposed Houphouet and a good many who have no record of opposition at all.

In Chad, trouble flared first last March, when northern Moslem leaders protested a cabinet reshuffle which removed a prominent northerner from the predominantly southern government. President Francois Tombalbaye promptly purged the most important Moslem personalities from his regime and arrested some 75 persons, mainly northerners, on charges of antigovernment activities. A trial in July resulted in a death sentence for one former cabinet minister and life terms for the former president of the National Assembly and two other high-level political figures. In September, demonstrations erupted in the Moslem quarter of the capital, Fort Lamy, when Tombalbaye ordered the arrest of three of the purged but still free Moslem leaders for planning a political meeting. Troops fired on the crowds, killing over 100 persons in the bloodiest incident which has occurred in any of the UAM states.

In the Brazzaville Congo Republic, conservative President Fulbert Youlou was forced to resign last August when the Congo Army refused to suppress popular demonstrations spearheaded by leftist labor leaders. A provisional government headed by moderate nationalist Alphonse

Massamba-Debat and consisting mostly of nonpolitical technicians took over. A new constitution was endorsed and a new legislature elected on 8 December. Youlou and his closest associates remain in detention.

In October, the Congo pattern was repeated in Dahomey, where President Hubert Maga was forced to step down after a week of strikes and demonstrations. Beginning as a protest against the arbitrary release of an assembly deputy involved in a murder case, the demonstrations soon escalated into an all-out drive to overthrow Maga's government. Army Chief of Staff Soglo --a professional soldier seemingly without political ambitions--took power as head of a provisional government initially composed of Maga and the leaders of two rival southern political factions. Early this month Maga was forced out entirely and placed under house arrest following revelation of what the regime claims to have been a northern-based counterrevolutionary plot.

Roots of Trouble

The immediate causes of these disturbances have been diverse, but in each case except Senegal, where there has been a continuing struggle between established power factions, they stemmed from the exclusion from power--or from the material rewards of power--of an important segment of the population.

In Togo, dissidence centered among a small group of African

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veterans of French Army service who were disgruntled over Olympio's refusal to absorb them into his tiny armed force. Most of the veterans were tribesmen from northern Togo who shared that region's resentment over southern domination of the government. The dissidence behind the plots in Ivory Coast appears to have been more broadly based. It apparently has included top politicians, middle and lower level government workers, tribal elements, and especially French-educated young intellectuals who as a group have been chafing under the conservative leadership of Houphouet and his generation.

In Congo, there was general discontent over poor economic conditions and over corruption in Youlou's government, as well as dissatisfaction on the part of individual labor leaders with the role Youlou proposed to assign them in his one-party state. In Chad the trouble stemmed from the traditional split between the pagan and Christian south, whose members predominate in the government and benefit the most from Chad's economic system, and the backward Moslem north. The overthrow of Maga in Dahomey came as a result of an explosion of various pent-up grievances and frustrations on the part of an assortment of southern elements, especially unionists, against Maga's northern-dominated government.

Behind this diversity of immediate circumstances lie

certain basic weaknesses common to all the UAM states. Despite their pretensions to sovereignty and modernity, they are in fact deficient, even by African standards, in economic, social, and political "infrastructure." Consequently, they are overwhelmingly dependent on foreign --i.e., French in all cases except Rwanda--underpinning, a fact which profoundly disturbs the growing ranks of younger European-educated elements. Moreover, the French colonial policy of assimilation left a psychological legacy of ingrained attitudes of mind and norms of conduct which made the older governing classes of these states less well-equipped than their counterparts in ex-British colonies to develop and execute programs for fostering economic and social progress. Instead, the established elites have tended to become bogged down in what Leopold Senghor, speaking in terms of Senegal, recently summarized as irresponsibility and bureaucratic complacency.

External Influences

External influences do not appear to have played a direct role in any of this year's disturbances in the UAM states, despite allegations to this effect by some of the affected leaders, notably Ivory Coast's Houphouet-Boigny, who seems convinced of the complicity of Communists and Ghana's Nkrumah. In the case of Congo, the appearance and speeches of Guinea's radical, dynamic leader, Sekou Touré, during a visit to

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Brazzaville last June probably did help condition the psychological climate for the August "revolution." There is no evidence, however, that Touré actually had a hand in Youlou's downfall.

Also in Congo, certain of the labor and youth leaders and intellectuals who were in the van of the movement against Youlou have long had close ties with Communist-front organizations and are known to have received funds and training from Soviet bloc sources in recent years. There is some evidence that such elements were in touch with Communist representatives across the river in Leopoldville while the anti-Youlou agitation was building to a climax. This evidence falls far short, however, of providing firm support for the hypothesis that the Communists planned and carried out the overthrow of Youlou.

Effects

The disturbances have so far produced little perceptible shift from a predominantly pro-Western foreign policy, even in the three states where governments were overturned. Togo, which joined the UAM after the January coup, has for the moment actually become more oriented toward France than it was under Olympio. Although the provisional Congo government has permitted considerable free-wheeling by leftist elements and the new government itself will probably attempt to appear less dependent on foreign powers

than Youlou was, it is unlikely that a significant change in orientation will occur provided Massamba-Debat remains in authority. The present provisional government in Dahomey seems even less likely to make any significant changes in the country's external posture.

The effects of the disturbances on internal affairs, on the other hand, has been fairly profound. Where established leaders have been ousted, the result has been the complete destruction of the regimes they established and continuing political chaos. Among surviving rulers there has been a universal increase in concern over personal security. Senegal's Senghor is reported increasingly fearful that his own regime will eventually be overthrown violently. Houphouet was quoted even last spring as voicing surprise that he had not yet been assassinated. Both Upper Volta President Yameogo and Malagasy Republic leader Tsiranana have remarked that they expect coup attempts before long.

Most leaders have reacted by adopting measures to stifle opposition groups and to bring under firm control all organizations through which opposition might be expressed. The result, however, is that the position of a number of the leaders now rests on a much narrower base than before. Houphouet's wholesale arrests, while probably reducing any immediate threat to his regime, have alienated large segments of Ivory Coast's population, as has the purge of Dia

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partisans in Senegal. Tombal-baye's suppression of northern Moslems in Chad has intensified the north-south rivalry in that country. The elimination or takeover by the government of all formal bodies which could serve as vehicles for presenting opposition demands is creating a situation wherein extralegal action is not only necessary to bring about a change of government, but is, in almost all cases, the only means of expressing serious criticism.

In each of the countries where a top leader was ousted, the military, even though only an embryonic institution by non-African standards, emerged as the decisive political authority. In each case the military assumed direct power after the removal of the constitutional head of state and then played a major role in constructing provisional regimes. In Dahomey, the army chief of staff, after trying unsuccessfully to name an all-civilian provisional government, finally had to assume formal direction of the provisional government himself before popular agitation would subside.

This rise of the military to political prominence has itself contributed to the concern of incumbent civilian leaders, who want greater protection but see inherent danger in becoming more dependent on military leaders. Last September Houphouet-Boigny displayed his lack of faith in Ivory Coast's regular security forces

by temporarily disarming large segments of the army and gendarmerie. He has entrusted his own security to a hand-picked presidential guard and that of the regime to a party militia. The army, he has announced, will be reduced in size and its mission confined to defending the frontier.

Similarly, President Dacko of the Central African Republic is considering reorganizing his army so as to reduce the number of troops and channel the activities of a large part of the remainder into public works functions.

Labor leaders, among whom leftists are prominent, have established themselves as major elements of the new power structures in two areas. In Congo they formed a "Liaison Committee" which reportedly sat in on provisional government cabinet meetings. These laborites seem certain to play an even more influential role in the new postelection government. In Dahomey, too, the unions which were prominent in the drive for Maga's ouster can be expected to exercise influence over the new government.

The latent threat posed by the existence of uncontrolled labor unions--one of the few potentially dynamic mass organizations in these countries--has caused the leaders of other states to continue to adopt measures to incorporate the unions within their regimes. This trend could become a source

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of new conflicts between governments and unionists striving to preserve their independence.

French Reaction

Paris, which is anxious to maintain its presence and influence in Africa, has sought throughout the recent disturbances to protect French interests in the African states while refusing to intervene militarily on behalf of unpopular regimes. France's future efforts will probably follow these same lines.

French policy has been influenced by the two schools of thought now contending among policymakers. One group led by Jacques Foccart, secretary general to the President for Afro-Malagasy affairs and a long-time associate of De Gaulle, advocates putting primary reliance on close personal relationships with established leaders or with dependable new ones where the former have been removed. The second school--including many officials in the Foreign Ministry--believes France should concentrate more on the development of progressive regimes and sound economic conditions.

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Outlook

All signs point to a further extension and a deepening of instability throughout the

UAM group. Even now there are indications that a major crisis may be shaping up in Niger, where the government already rests on a narrow tribal base. In Senegal, where Senghor's regime has just won an election marked by considerable bloodshed, the frustrated opposition reportedly intends to continue a campaign of violence. Under the three new regimes, no progress toward genuine stability is discernible, although Togo's government is nearly a year old.

The increased influence of radical elements in Congo and Dahomey suggests that there is going to be a leftward shift in the postures of those states, even though this has not been apparent to a great extent up to now. More nationalistic, independent-minded elements influenced by Marxist concepts are likely to become more important. Such shifts--and even simply the power vacuums which are developing--will open up a heretofore largely closed area of Africa to Communist penetration.

[redacted] Soviet bloc representatives are already moving to exploit the continuing confusion in Congo and Dahomey.

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Both moderate successor and surviving "old guard" regimes, influenced by the realization that overwhelming economic dependence on France is not solving their economic


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problems and perhaps also by De Gaulle's refusal to come to the aid of Youlou or Maga, are likely to try to loosen ties with Paris. Houphouet-Boigny has already expressed a desire to lessen French influence, or at least to dilute the French presence, in Ivory Coast. While these African leaders are most likely to turn first to other Western sources, particularly the EEC and the US, they will almost certainly be increasingly tempted--in some instances prodded by their compatriots--at least to explore the possibilities of obtaining Communist aid.

At the same time, the spreading disintegration of the "old

order" power structures within individual UAM states seems likely to hasten the demise of the UAM itself as a formal grouping. Already weakened by internal frictions and on the defensive against stepped-up attacks from radical Africans, the organization has been further troubled as a result of members' confusion and differences over how to react to sudden changes of regimes within the grouping. In recent weeks there have been indications, notably on the part of Gabon and its immediate UAM neighbors, that henceforth greater interest and emphasis will be focused on the development of smaller, more strictly regional associations.



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